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Agamben and the political positioning of child welfare–involved mothers in child 
protective services  
 
Abstract 
In the UK protecting children from maltreatment is an administrative and juridical system 
with law as ultimate arbiter of whether a mother may retain care of her child. The 
primary legal principle is the child’s best interests. This paper draws on Giorgio 
Agamben’s theory of ‘bare life’ (1995) to examine the identity and the political 
positioning of child welfare–involved mothers in contemporary western child protection 
systems to complement the primary focus on their children. 
A fundamental underlying issue, namely the control of life and its significance for 
women involved with state bureaucratic administrative and legal child protective services 
is examined and its significance for the biopolitical identity of child welfare-involved 
mothers in child protective services. 
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Child maltreatment poses society with a complex problem with material consequences 
for the lives of children. In the UK protecting children from maltreatment is managed 
within an administrative and juridical system with law as ultimate arbiter of whether a 
mother may retain care of her child1. The primary legal principle is the child’s best 
interests. Any recourse to law is generally preceded by the operation of universal 
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administrative processes that govern decision-making for individual children. In the 
context of this paper child protective services2 refers to state intervention in the lives of 
families through the child protection system. In most cases child welfare statutes 
underpin this involvement. The implications for children of maltreatment and the 
capacity of public institutions to protect their interests continue to occupy a central focus 
in international policy development and global public imaginations. In contemporary 
western child protective policies, child welfare – involved mothers are treated both as 
part of the problem and of the solution to child maltreatment and, arguably, ‘bear the 
brunt’ of the state’s determination of the acceptable limits of parenting through its 
attention on their maternal care.   
 
This paper draws on Giorgio Agamben’s philosophical theory of ‘bare life’ (1995) to 
examine the identity and the political positioning of child welfare–involved mothers to 
complement the primary focus on their children. The aim is to bring this theoretical 
perspective to child welfare/protection scholarship and to contribute to wider 
conversations on the position of women in relation to the institutional power of child 
protective services. The paper draws attention to a fundamental underlying issue 
identified by Agamben, namely the control of life and its significance for women 
involved with state bureaucratic administrative and legal child protective services. It 
draws on an earlier body of work on child welfare-involved mothers to explore an issue 
that has long vexed child maltreatment discourse, namely the significance of the complex 
social institution of child protective services on practitioner-mother relations. The 
intention is to provide a more expansive reading relevant to relations between child-
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welfare involved mothers and child protective services so as to enrich our understanding 
of their position and the possible implications that follow. Agamben’s notion of ‘bare 
life’ falling outside the polis or as mere existence (1995) allows a new angle to the 
examination of the political nature of women’s position in contemporary child protective 
services. 
 
The paper is divided into four parts. These include: first, the reasons for concentrating 
selectively on women caught up in child protective services; second, a review of an 
earlier body of work on child welfare-involved mothers; three, an introduction to 
Agamben’s ideas (not only a difficult theorist but also one not well known, particularly in 
social work) drawing on his original work, Homo Sacer Sovereign Power and Bare Life 
(1995) where he discusses what it is to be recognized as human; and four, the 
implications and limitations of Agamben’s ideas in relation to child welfare involved-
mothers in child protective services. 
 
 Why focus on women?  
 
Poor women have historically been the subject of state surveillance, some enabling but 
more often intrusive interventions. Women occupy a particular position in UK child 
protective services as child welfare-involved mothers, comprising the majority of clients 
(Howe, 1994) and often constituting a primary focus of attention from the state as well as 
a primary source of protection (Scourfield, 2001) in the safeguarding of children referred 
to child protective services (Featherstone, 1999). Masson et al. (2008) found over 86% of 
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children subject to care proceedings in England were cared for by their mothers, of whom 
nearly 60% were lone parents. By focusing on women this is neither to deny that some 
children are harmed by the actions and inactions of their mothers nor to minimise 
professional public duty of child safety surveillance; nor is it to undermine the paramount 
interests of children to child protective services. 
 
Despite the importance of women to child protective services and the suggestion 
protecting children from child maltreatment is a gendered activity (Reich, 2008; Howe, 
1994), our understanding of how women fit into child protective services is relatively 
limited (Reich, 2008), including that women’s behaviour towards their children may 
constitute a source of concern in its own right (Taplin and Mattick, 2011). Women’s 
position as child welfare-involved mothers is distinct in one particular respect, namely 
the role of women’s bodies in giving birth to another human life, as bearers of children 
whose maternal care is subject to state scrutiny, their standing as mothers measured 
against professional expectations.  
 
Featherstone et al. (2013) suggest that the very language of the child protection system 
separates the child from her/his family. Reich (2008) argues the family unit, once 
involved with child protective services, ‘….dissolves into a collection of individuals, 
presumed to have competing interests, who are connected by history, biology and tenuous 
legal ties’ (p.901). This recognises that the interests of child welfare-involved mothers 
and children are not necessarily compatible (mothers may harm their children). Child 
welfare policy and law in the UK makes children’s interests paramount in child 
 PAGE  5 
protective decision-making. By virtue of this determination, the interests of mothers are 
by definition secondary to their children.  
 
This secondary dispositional status of women to their children in child protective services 
is itself a reason for shifting the analytical focus to them. As Mies (1993) suggests, a 
conscious partiality brings to the surface important perspectives that might otherwise be 
overlooked or that might dilute intensity of understanding from a particular point of view. 
This partiality might be further justified in the case of child welfare-involved mothers by 
the need to appreciate better what may be at stake for a group of women many of who are 
already on the margins of society. A number of studies of child abuse and neglect (see, 
for example, Dumbrill, 2006) do not disaggregate the category of parent in their analysis, 
minimizing the capacity to differentiate between mothers and fathers and possibly 
minimizing women’s history in the care of children (Ruddick, 1989). 
  
The doctrine of social rights in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (GAOR 217A (111) December 10, 1948) under Article 25 grants that motherhood 
and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance and asserts all children whether 
born out of wedlock shall enjoy the same protection. Under this doctrine motherhood as 
well as childhood confer social rights, making both child-bearing women and children 
worthy of special consideration. All children should have the same protection, 
irrespective of the social legal status of individual women. For the above reasons a focus 
on child welfare-involved mothers is adopted in this paper.  
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An earlier body of work on child welfare-involved mothers 
 
Child welfare-involved women for the most part are categorically unequal in society 
for their share in its wealth, education, health and development (Baker, 1995, Sheppard, 
2004 cited in Katz, 2007), politically positioned on the margins.  Marcenko et al. (2011) 
in a statewide examination of the psychosocial and demography of child-welfare 
involved mothers found ‘impoverished mothers’ (p.436) often struggling with personal 
trauma and mental health-related difficulties and domestic violence. Kohl et al. (2011) in 
a USA national probability sample of a 36 month follow-up of mothers referred to child 
protective services concluded that maternal depression impeded child protective services 
intervention and their capacity to ensure child safety. The percentage of mothers 
reporting depression remained relatively stable and relatively high across the time period 
and yet they were less likely than the general population to be in receipt of mental health 
services. Broadhurst and Mason (2013) argue for a preventive approach in meeting the 
mental health needs of women. 
 
The concept of mothering is becoming more complex, differentiated along lines of race 
and class while the legitimation of different kinds of family form serves to render the 
position of biological mothers as more fungible (Woodhouse, 2002), in other words able 
to be replaced by another answering to the same definition (Oxford Dictionary). In 
principle, any responsible adult may carry out maternal work (Ruddick, 1989), although 
in practice historically the world-over women bear the main responsibility for the 
upbringing of children. Reich (2008) in her sociological analysis of the child welfare 
 PAGE  7 
system in the USA, argues that the state both reinforces changing forms of family life, 
through recognition of the separation of biological and social motherhood, in other words 
differentiating between motherhood and ‘mother work’ and at the same time legitimating 
non-normative family formations with consequences for biological mothers. 
 
Davies and Krane (2006) identify that the subjective experiences of child welfare–
involved mothers are relatively neglected. Several studies explore the identity of child 
welfare-involved mothers. A two year ethnographic study (Reich 2002) of investigated 
allegations of child abuse and neglect and agency and court processes associated with 
outcomes found once mothering was called into question, then the right to mothering 
became determined against conformity to dominant ideologies of an idealized notion of 
mothering and womanhood held by professionals in child protective and associated 
services. Ideal motherhood involved a commitment to their children above and beyond 
their own sexual relationships with men, where control of women’s sexual behavior and 
monitoring of women’s sexuality remained a long standing trope in decisions about child 
welfare-involved mothers. Sykes (2011) in her study of mothers’ responses to accusations 
of child neglect in a rural Michigan county, found women resisted their classification by 
the state as ‘neglectful mothers’. They employed a range of strategies in order to protect 
their identity as good mothers. In a study of Judith Butler’s philosophical writing on the 
emergence of self, Waterhouse and McGhee (2013) argued child welfare-involved 
mothers are required to give an account of themselves and their maternal care in 
circumstance where the exercise of institutional power might act as a means of reduction 
in their lives (Ojakangas 2005), of a lessening rather than augmentation.  
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Despite the rhetoric of family support, child care policy provides a limited time for so-
called ‘failed mothers’ to improve their child rearing or face the loss of their child. 
Douglas and Walsh (2009) found that Australian child welfare-involved mothers lacked 
sufficient advocacy in their dealings with child protective services (as did Featherstone 
and Fraser 2012 in an in-depth exploration of the experiences of three women 
participating in a parental advocacy scheme in England) and sufficient information to 
participate fully in proceedings. Child protective services were experienced as adversarial 
in their relations with child welfare-involved mothers.   
 
Giorgio Agamben’s philosophical theory of ‘bare life’ 
 
Giorgio Agamben is a legal philosopher educated at the University of Rome. Homo 
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life  (1995), the theory at the heart of this paper, is 
concerned with a key problem of our modern social existence, namely the State’s 
production of ‘bare life’ or life as mere existence in its exercise of power over citizens. 
The work is rooted in the traditions of European philosophy and seeks to reformulate 
ideas to take account of scientific advances and the political treatment of human subjects. 
Drawing on historical examples of internment in concentration camps from Cuba in 1896 
to the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s and the Nazi German concentration camps 
in between, Agamben argues, the State is exposed as depriving individuals in the camps 
of very basic human rights and of disposing of them rather than protecting them against 
such an outcome. The State is implicated in the production of ‘bare life’, mere existence, 
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constituting a key problem in modern western societies when it comes to the just and 
unjust treatment of individuals in the governance of biological life. Of fundamental 
concern is the question what is it to be human, its true ethos. While the examples appear 
at first in their historical context, their salience for contemporary society is articulated in 
the idea that the camp is not only an historical fact but is present today as ‘the hidden 
matrix and nomos of the political space in which we are still living.’ (pp.166). Although 
the camp is not the only kind of case to illustrate this idea, its selection is no accident 
since it is seen to represent the most extreme form of the destruction of human 
experience, where life suffers a very great loss, when life at best can be merely 
undergone (Mills p.466). The premise that life as mere existence becomes the human 
condition in the absence of government, is turned on its head when Agamben argues 
mere existence can be found in the presence of government which is no guarantee of 
protection for its people against extreme misfortune from other than natural causes. It is 
in the exercise of control over the collective lives of all individuals the key characteristic 
of the modern period is found (Ross, 2007), life as a politically determined concept 
within modern western societies. Further to the question of what is it to be human and to 
be part of human society lies another uncertainty - whether there is anything sacred about 
life?  
 
This question of sacredness of life is approached through the figure of homo sacer, an 
enigmatic figure of archaic Roman law who has existed from pre-social time ‘in which 
the character of sacredness is tied for the first time to a human life as such’ (Agamben 
p.71). Homo sacer represents ‘sacred man’, a life signified by being outside human 
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/natural and divine law (ibid. p. 82) or put another way life as an accursed ‘man’ 
outlawed, an outcast.  A life outside human and divine law is a life that is expendable 
may be eliminated, killed without human punishment, without attracting an accusation of 
homicide; and at the same time is a life deemed unworthy of the rituals of sacrifice in 
divine law. For example, certain individuals historically who became subject to the 
medieval ban with return on pain of death and the bandit as a figure of a ‘man’ who can 
be killed without normal consequence - accursed and outlawed, homo sacer.  
 
Of central importance to this paper are the consequences of this potential position for 
indigent citizens that, by definition can only leave them exposed and subject to Sovereign 
power in its supreme and unmitigated capacity. Sovereign power, while it may be rarely 
used, grants the sovereign (the ruler) absolute judicial power to suspend the normal rules 
of law governing people lives where the spirit of law and the regulation of law no longer 
apply. This in effect produces a formal ban, an authoritative prohibition (Oxford 
Dictionary, 1976) where citizens are treated as if exiles through physical or mental 
containment and exclusion from society either as individuals or as a group. The banned 
individual is left without recourse to the normal expectations, rights and legal rules 
associated with human existence. The imposition of absolute sovereign power constitutes 
an exception, a state of exception that may begin as a temporary measure in extreme 
circumstances of supposed need but may become normalized, creating a new set of 
normative expectations regarding human life affecting everyone inside and outside the 
new dispensation.  
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The consequences of this suspension from the normal rules and exclusion from society 
are captured in the concept of bare life, life as mere existence where individual life may 
be extinguished without punishment and death not represented as sacrifice as exemplified 
in the concentration camps. In bare life the biological being, the human body is separated 
from its normal political status, is treated as if not fully human and is abandoned under a 
new prevailing norm (state of exception) to extreme misfortune (p.159). The rights and 
expectations normally associated with human existence are stripped away while the body 
remains alive and subject to complete political calculation (Ross, 2007). For those 
individuals outside the ban who are not subject to living their lives as mere existence, the 
fact that some individuals may be treated in this way means that all citizens have the 
potential to become an excluded class of people.  This lies at the root of the fragility of 
humans to the potential suspension of judicial order even in non-totalitarian states 
(Arendt 1958), when law is made irrelevant for some despite it remaining in force for 
others. When what began, as a state of exception becomes a permanent structure, a new 
set of rules, grounding principles and assumptions come to dominate the ordering of 
political power, a new ‘nomos’ emerges - a fundamental ethical and political problem 
arises for the treatment of human life.  
 
 
Agamben argues the Camp represents the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of modern 
western society where decisions on the value and non-value of human life are made and 
acted upon. The Camp is a total institution, a political organisation of human life founded 
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solely on bare life where every aspect of physiological and (mental) life is regulated 
(Agamben, 1995:135). It is achieved through interference (suspension of law for some) 
with the rights of citizenship (political life) and may be taken to the very limits of 
biological existence (bare life). The Camp, characterized by the suspension of law and 
the condition of bare life is seen as the hidden matrix (Agamben, 1995:166) of current 
political life.  
 
The implications of Agamben’s ideas for the political and social position of child 
welfare-involved mothers  
 
What can we learn from this reading of Agamben when it comes to the example of child 
welfare-involved mothers in contact with child protective services? The intention here is 
to provide a fresh reading of the political position of these child welfare–involved 
mothers.  In child protective services control over the life of the child is disputed for 
humanitarian reasons of child welfare and safety. At the same time to effect child safety, 
control over the women’s lives becomes an inevitable by-product bringing consequences 
for their identity and political position as mothers. This analysis seeks neither to privilege 
the interests of mothers over their children nor to imply that child protective services act 
in bad faith. Women in contact with child protective services are not randomly drawn, 
instead their lives dominated by poverty and restricted life chances. Smith (2010) argues 
that Agamben pays insufficient attention to the specific and stratified characteristics of 
individuals subject to state intervention, for example class and gender. This paper 
considers Agamben’s ideas in relation to a group of individuals where gender and class 
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frequently intersect. The discussion begins with implications of Agamben’s ideas, 
followed by consideration of the particular procedure of pre-birth decision-making in 
child protective services for illustrative purposes.  
 
Agamben’s interest to sociologists and other social scientists lies in two main areas. 
Firstly, his contribution to social theory where the character of Western democratic 
governance is examined to reveal the importance of the ‘Camp’, concentration camps as 
the prototype of timeless examples, as the underlying hidden principle of sovereign 
power, namely the absolute right to do anything to anyone (Agamben ibid p.106) (Smith 
2010; Mills 2011). Secondly, his claim that in public institutions of a certain complexity 
professional disciplines may exercise control over the definition of life, and in so doing 
biopolitical power passes through them. Prisoners held on death row in the United States, 
an example provided by Agamben, were used as subjects of an experiment in the 1920’s 
when 800 people were infected with malaria plasmodia to combat an infectious agent. 
Scientists and physicians took control over life that was previously reserved for sovereign 
power whereby these prisoners entered an indeterminate zone between life and death, a 
‘no-man’s-land’, their human rights abandoned, their lives reduced to mere existence 
(bare life). In Agamben’s terms Sovereign power is passing through physician and 
scientist exercising control over the definition of life. As in concentration camps, 
Agamben argues these prisoners were assimilated to the status of homines sacres, a life 
that can be killed without constituting homicide because the prisoners were already 
sentenced to death.  
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These two dimensions, the Camp as the underlying principle of social governance and the 
passing of biopolitical power through professionals challenge the status quo (Smith 2010) 
of our apparently Western liberal governance structures. The range of examples 
Agamben provides together with the suggestion of an incursion into the professional 
domain leaves an uneasy prospect that abandonment by and to the state and its officers 
may be more routinely present in the exercise of institutional power over citizens than 
meets the eye. The governance of exclusion made apparent through Agamben’s 
examination of extreme cases is the more telling because it suggests the State is 
implicated in the production of ‘bare life’, the mere existence of its citizens. The point he 
is making is that bare life is present in democratic (non-totalitarian) societies and is not 
confined to the extreme example of concentration camps. This is brought into sharp relief 
when exposure to death and abandonment by law is found in other institutions, for 
example in prisons and the experiments on death row prisoners. It is the treatment of 
certain groups of people by public institutions that is of particular concern to the 
discussion of child welfare-involved mothers in child protective services. These women 
can be seen as an extreme case of a particular kind.  
 
There is no suggestion that contact with child protective services whose purpose is 
intended as humanitarian reduces child welfare-involved mothers to a form of ‘bare life’ 
– a mere existence as happened in the concentration camps. Child welfare-involved 
mothers are not deprived of the right to live, retain legal rights and may lay claim to 
certain social rights. They are not sequestered in physical space nor excluded from every 
aspect of society. The State can lay claim to legitimate authority in safeguarding the 
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interests of children. Yet Agamben gives us reason to question the character of the 
exercise of control over life even in humanitarian institutions.  
 
Mothers stand to lose the care of their children when deemed by child protective services 
to be in the child’s best interests, whatever the potential significance of their 
dispossession and attendant loss.  This possible outcome affects the identity and political 
status of women as mothers. Many child protective decisions occur outside legal 
arbitration. Errors made in judgment against child welfare-involved mothers are unlikely 
to attract much attention or redress. Attention is primarily reserved for any state failure in 
the detection of child maltreatment and errors in professional judgement (Munro, 2011). 
Child welfare-involved mothers may have little leverage in a system of governance that is 
more or less free to do with them what they will so long as the system can claim the 
child’s best interest principle as the basis for child protective decision-making. They may 
fear that to challenge decisions about their care of their child lest separation is 
precipitated. At the same time they may consider themselves subject to negative 
perceptions of their mothering they are unable to alter (Sykes 2011).  
 
Many child welfare-involved mothers are poor and lone parents, leaving them exposed 
and inherently vulnerable when face-to-face with child protective services, an 
increasingly powerful arm of the state. Compromised by their social position, their 
capacity to negotiate child protective intervention and to defend their maternal interests is 
weakened. Child welfare-involved mothers may lose their identity as mothers with 
limited protection and the loss of their child is unlikely to be constituted as a sacrifice as 
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it would be in the case of sons and daughters lost to war. In Agamben’s terms the women 
could be seen as in a homines sacres like position in circumstances when control over 
life, child and mother, is contested with the consequence that women may be stripped of 
their identity and political position as mothers. 
 
In child protective services bio-political power passes through professional disciplines 
that exercise control over life, self-evident for the child but less so for the women whose 
identity and political position is simultaneously affected. The risk here is the ever-present 
potential of what could amount to an essentially dehumanising treatment of child welfare-
involved mothers in contact with these services. Given the dual professional 
responsibility not only to take account of the child’s best interest but also of women in 
their own right, the treatment of child welfare-involved mothers is of critical importance. 
Alertness to the identity and political position of women in contact with child protective 
services is a necessary counterweight to a risk of dehumanising women, of treating child 
welfare-involved mothers as non-persons, set outside the polis and reduced to ‘mere’ 
bearers of children. 
 
In UK child protective services pre-birth child protective decisions have become a more 
common practice, partly influenced by high profile inquiries into the fatal non-accidental 
injury of children (see, for example, O’Brien 2003;see also Dale’s 2013 commentary on 
restricting natural parent-infant contact in care proceedings in England; care applications 
increased by 75% between 2007-08 and 2012-13, Cafcass 2012, see note3). Pre-birth 
multi-agency interdisciplinary conferences decide if a child should be removed at birth 
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from the mother’s care, subject to legal provisions, based on a prediction of the likelihood 
of child maltreatment. Legal outcomes may be temporary or permanent: to return the 
child home or to seek permanent alternative care for the child4.  
 
Pre-birth conferences can be seen to exemplify a procedure with the potential for 
exclusionary governance. There is a risk that child welfare-involved mothers may 
become  ‘mere’ bearers of their children, their lives as mothers made spare. In 
biopolitical terms child welfare-involved mothers subject to pre-birth conferences can 
become reduced to a body that has hosted the development of another body - a kind of 
bare life. The emergence of pre-birth case conferences demonstrates the capacity of the 
institution to compromise the political identity of child welfare-involved-mothers. Once 
deemed a ‘bad’ mother, it is difficult to prove the converse. Resistance to their child’s 
removal at birth may be interpreted as further evidence of compromising the well being 
of their child. While child welfare-involved mothers retain some rights to due process, 
the State’s capacity to control life sanctioned by law and procedure remains evident.  
 
Applying Agamben’s arguments to child protective services and one procedure (pre-birth 
case conference) may seem a far-reaching interpretation.  Nevertheless there are other 
examples where the political position of child welfare - involved women is compromised. 
Smith (2010) found that some welfare applicants, not even in contact with child 
protective services (in three American States), were required to go through pro-adoption 
counselling to be eligible for welfare means-tested aid. These child welfare-involved 
mothers were encouraged to relinquish custodial rights of their children, potentially 
 PAGE  18 
becoming mere bearers of life. A recent court case in Scotland convicted two social 
workers of contempt of court following their failure to implement a court order requiring 
a certain level of access between a mother and her separated children in public care (The 
Scotsman 2013). These institutional actions could be considered a suspension of law 
passing through the professionals that in this case was checked through recourse to law, 
reconstituting the political position of the welfare involved-mother. A final example 
involves two court cases of forced caesarean sections in England where maternal mental 
health was deemed incapacitating for maternal decision-making regarding birth (BBC 
2013, 2014). These latter cases do not involve suspension of law, although illustrate State 
control over life, both mother and unborn child. The examples cited above are not 
intended to suggest that the physical lives of child welfare-involved mothers are in 
danger (namely, Agamben’s analysis of the Camp) nor are they to ignore some children 
die as a result of maltreatment. In the case of the examples of forced caesarean, however, 
there must be some risk to life for mother and unborn child. Agamben’s paradigm can 
help us to see a bigger picture - ‘that modernity is characterized by an increasingly more 
radical tendency to take control of “life”’ (Ross 2007:2). 
 
This paper suggests a plurality of application of Agamben’s writing to the potential 
significance for child welfare-involved mothers of the political context in which child 
protective services operate, especially the potential significance for women when their 
motherhood may be rendered redundant. It helps us to understand better women’s 
exposure to control over life, both child and mother.  
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Conclusion 
Agamben’s theoretical stance helps us appreciate the magnitude of what is present in the 
contact between child welfare-involved mothers and child protective services where a 
form of control of life is passing through the professionals who animate the system in 
their face-to-face encounters with the women. There is the potential for physical 
separation from the child (from the body) to which they gave birth whether this happens 
at birth or later. Women may be dispossessed of their children, stripped of their political 
identity as mothers, placed outside the polis, bringing them perilously close to a form, 
albeit more partial, of mere existence. In these ways Agamben’s argument that the Camp 
represents the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of modern western society has bearing 
for the control over life represented in child protective services where decisions on the 
value and non-value of mothering are made and acted upon. 
 
In providing a more expansive reading of Agamben’s work to the position of child 
welfare-involved mothers, this paper alerts us to the vicissitudes of their exposure to the 
institutional power of child protective services. It brings to the fore what is at stake in any 
evaluation of maternal care, namely the potential for it to be deemed without value for 
child or society.  In the context where the primary operating legal principle is the child’s 
best interests, this paper argues it is important to pay scrupulous attention to a fair, 
humane and proportionate consideration of the position of women in contact with child 
protective services.  
 
Notes 
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1 The child protection system is used in this paper to refer to the comprehensive 
administrative and juridical system concerned with the protection of children from 
maltreatment.  
2 Child protective services are sometimes referred to as child protection services in some 
countries.  
3 In England, an ‘unprecedented rise’ in care applications by local authorities followed 
the publication of the review into the death of a child Peter Connelly (Baby P) in 2008 
(Cafcass 2012: i). By 2012-13 there was a 75% increase in the number of care 
applications in comparison to 2007-08 (6,323 to 11,110 respectively). This consistent 
upward trend has continued until 2013-14, which saw an annual reduction of 5% on the 
previous year to 10,595 applications (Cafcass 2014).  In addition local authorities appear 
to be making applications at an earlier stage of their involvement with families (Cafcass 
2012). 
4 Court sanctioned adoption without the consent of parents (sometimes referred to as non-
consensual adoption) is permitted within UK legislative frameworks. In England, in the 
year ending 31 March 2012 1,890 adoption orders (55%) were made unopposed, and 
1,550 (45%) where consent was dispensed with, following opposition to the application 
(Luckock and Broadhurst 2013). There has been an increase in placement orders (where 
the court decides parental consent can be dispensed with and makes a placement order) 
Between 2012 and 2013 the number of looked after children placed for adoption 
increased by 16 per cent compared to 25 per cent between 2009 and 2013. There has been 
a similar level of increase, namely 16 per cent between 2012-2013, of the number of 
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looked after children for whom a placement order has been granted and by 95 per cent 
between 2009-2013 (Department of Education 2013). 
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